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REVERSING THE EVILS OF FEDERAL MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCES: IS CLEMENCY THE ONLY
ANSWER?
Examining the Clemency and Legislative Policies of the Obama
and Trump Administrations within the United States
Criminal Justice Context
Melissa Johnson*
INTRODUCTION
Thirty-five years ago, Alice Marie Johnson lived a full life.1 She
was a wife, a mother of five children, and a manager at FedEx.2
Then divorce, the death of one of her children, and job loss shattered her world.3 Ms. Johnson was able to find employment as a
factory worker, a role which paid only a fraction of her former salary and was insufficient to support her children.4 Desperate and
burdened, she became a telephone mule for drug dealers.5 She was
instructed to “pass phone messages [and] [w]hen people came to
town . . . [to tell] them what number to call for drug transactions.”6
Alice Marie Johnson’s role as a telephone mule can be likened to
some drug couriers in smuggling operations.7 Drug trafficking

* Associate, Andersen. St. John’s University School of Law ‘19.
1 See Alice Marie Johnson, Why Kim Kardashian thinks I should be released from
prison, CNN (June 7, 2018, 8:04 A.M.), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/28/opinions/obamaclemency-johnson-opinion/index.html.
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 See Victoria Law, Mothers Serving Long-Term Drug Sentences Call for Clemency,
TRUTHOUT (Sept. 11, 2015), https://truthout.org/articles/mothers-serving-long-term-drugsentences-call-for-clemency/.
5 See Johnson, supra note 1.
6 Law, supra note 4.
7 See Adam B. Weber, The Courier Conundrum: The High Costs of Prosecuting LowLevel Drug Couriers and What We Can Do About Them, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1751
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rings often recruit women as drug couriers.8 These female drug
couriers are often disconnected from the intricate workings of the
drug conspiracy and are only expected to transport the drugs.9
Their minuscule role in the drug ring means they are at a disadvantage during the prosecutorial process because they have little
information to trade in exchange for a lesser charge.10 Such was
Ms. Johnson’s story.11 She had never been charged with or convicted of a crime.12 Nor was she a drug kingpin or ringleader.13 Yet
she was convicted of “conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and deliver, money laundering, conspiracy to commit money
laundering and structuring a monetary transaction” after her codefendants testified against her.14
In the end, Alice Marie Johnson was sentenced to life in prison
as a first-time nonviolent drug offender under the mandatory minimum sentencing laws.15 In Ms. Johnson’s words, she “was given
a death sentence without sitting on death row” when she was convicted on October 31, 1996.16
Through the Clemency Initiative 2014 (“Clemency Initiative”),
President Barack Obama sought to use his clemency power to give
(2019) (explaining that both couriers and mules are similar because both “occupy the lowest
levels of the hierarchy of a drug-trafficking organization.”).
8 See id. at 1766 (explaining that “[f]rom the perspective of law enforcement officers, for
example, women may appear less dangerous and thus less suspicious.”).
9 See id. at 1764-65 (clarifying that “though many drug couriers occupy the lowest levels
of the drug organization’s hierarchy, not all drug couriers are alike . . . some couriers run
sophisticated operations to smuggle drugs across borders.”).
10 See id. at 1753.
11 See Law, supra note 4 (implying prosecutors did not grant much leniency to Johnson).
12 See Johnson, supra note 1.
13 See Law, supra note 4 (Johnson insisted she “never made drug deals or sold drugs”);
Julieta Chiquillo, ‘I’m that miracle’: Woman pardoned by Trump at Kim Kardashian’s behest visits girls at Dallas County Detention Center, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 27, 2018,
10:43 A.M.), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2018/09/27/i-m-that-miracle-woman-pardoned-by-trump-at-kim-kardashian-s-behest-visits-girls-at-dallas-county-detention-center/ (stating that Johnson was considered a low-level drug offender).
14 Peter Baker, Alice Marie Johnson Is Granted Clemency by Trump After Push by Kim
Kardashian West, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2018, 8:04 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us/politics/trump-alice-johnson-sentence-commuted-kim-kardashian-west.html.; Law, supra note 4.
15 See Johnson, supra note 1; see also Tonyaa Weathersbee, Alice Marie Johnson survived desperation and injustice. Now she’s helping others do the same, COM. APPEAL (June
3, 2019, 2:53 PM), https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2019/06/03/alice-mariejohnson-kim-kardashian-west-president-trump-pardon/1330927001/.
16 See Johnson, supra note 1.
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convicted nonviolent and low-level drug offenders, who would have
received substantially lesser sentences under more recent federal
sentencing laws, a second chance.17 However, Alice Marie Johnson
did not benefit from Obama’s efforts.18 Instead, Alice Marie Johnson received her second chance when her sentence was commuted
on June 6, 2018.19 This happened because Kim Kardashian West
and Jared Kushner petitioned President Donald J. Trump to exercise his clemency power and pardon Ms. Johnson.20 Alice Marie
Johnson’s story moved an empathetic Kim Kardashian West to action.21 In a CNN interview with Van Jones, Kardashian West said,
“I felt like she’s a good person. You can see that in her.”22
President Trump’s positive response to Kardashian West’s and
Kushner’s activism caused some confusion among President
Trump’s critics and a conflict among his supporters, since the
17 See U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, OFF. PARDON ATT’Y, CLEMENCY INITIATIVE,
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-initiative (last updated Dec. 11, 2018); see also
Shaun King, Alice Marie Johnson is Free. Now it’s Time to Free Thousands More Prisoners
with Unjustly Long Sentences, APPEAL (June 15, 2018), https://theappeal.org/alice-mariejohnson-is-free-now-its-time-to-free-thousands-of-more-prisoners-with-unjustly-long-sentences/.
18 See Johnson, supra note 1 (Johnson wrote, “The week before Christmas 2016, President Barack Obama gave a second chance—in the form of clemency—to 231 people, including my friend Sharanda Jones. I was not among them.”); see also CLEMENCY INITIATIVE,
supra note 17. The Obama-era DOJ denied Johnson’s request for clemency consideration
three times. See Michelle Mark, Trump has granted clemency to Alice Johnson, freeing the
63-year-old grandmother whose case was championed by Kim Kardashian, BUS . INSIDER
(June 6, 2018, 12:27 P.M.), https://www.businessinsider.com/alice-johnson-trump-clemency-pardon-kim-kardashian-west-2018-5. Moreover, 7,881 Clemency Initiative applications were never reviewed, and 8,880 Clemency Initiative applicants never received a response. See King, supra note 17.
19 See Press Release, White House, President Trump Commutes Sentence of Alice Marie
Johnson (June 6, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/presidenttrump-commutes-sentence-alice-marie-johnson/.
20 See Emily Jane Fox, Keeping Up the Kushners: With Jared Back on Top, Kim Kardashian Heads to the White House, VANITY FAIR (May 30, 2018, 5:00 A.M.),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/05/keeping-up-with-the-kushners-kim-kardashianwhite-house-visit-prison-reform. Jared Kushner, Senior Advisor to the President, is seemingly passionate about prison reform, and, prior to Alice Johnson’s sentence commutation
and release from prison, he had a number of discussions with Kim Kardashian West regarding criminal justice reform. Id. Additionally, “Kushner has made significant progress
in getting Republican lawmakers on board with the effort, bringing law enforcement officials and Evangelical leaders to the White House, taking meetings on Capitol Hill, and
hosting dinner parties with key Washington power players at the home he shares with his
wife, Ivanka Trump.” Id.
21 See Darran Simon, Kim Kardashian said she felt ‘connection’ to Alice Johnson and
wanted to help, CNN (June 7, 2018, 7:04 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/07/us/kim-kardashian-alice-johnson-interview/index.html.
22 Id.
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Trump Administration did not continue the Clemency Initiative,
and then Attorney General Jeff Sessions declared a ‘War on Crime’
approach to criminal justice.23 As dialogue heated up over criminal
justice reform, there was uncertainty as to whether President
Trump would continue President Obama’s exercise of the clemency
power to correct the mass incarceration that plagues the federal
prison system, or whether he would fuel a second wave of the War
on Drugs.24
Ultimately, the Trump Administration recognized that neither
one-off clemency grants nor an ill-equipped clemency program that
lacked sufficient resources and structure could solve America’s
mass incarceration problem.25 Rather, the Trump Administration
understood legislative sentencing reform was the better solution
to provide lasting relief to first-time, low-level, and nonviolent
drug offenders serving draconian mandatory minimum sentences.26
This Note argues the uncertainty inherent in the use of the clemency power with the change of each administration and the bias
inherent in the exercise of clemency makes clemency an improper
tool to correct the mass incarceration of first-time, low-level, and
nonviolent drug offenders. Part I examines the governmental and
societal climate that formed the impetus for U.S. mandatory minimum sentencing laws. Part II discusses the impact of U.S. mandatory minimum sentencing laws on the American criminal justice
system, namely how it has led to the growth of mass incarceration.
Part III looks at clemency and how it is used by past and current
presidents to correct sentencing injustices. Part IV posits that legislative reform, not presidential clemency, is the most effective tool
to correct the consequences of U.S. mandatory minimum sentencing laws.

23 See infra Part III.D.; Johnson, supra note 1 (detailing how Alice Johnson referred to
Kim Kardashian West and Jared Kushner as unlikely voices to be her advocates; see also
Erin Jensen, Kim Kardashian West talks ‘mission’ of commuting Alice Johnson, Trump’s
‘compassion’, USA TODAY (June 14, 2018, 9:22 A.M.), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2018/06/14/kim-kardashian-west-alice-johnson-today-show-hodakotb/700890002/.
24 See infra Parts III.C. & III.D.
25 See infra Part IV.
26 See infra Part IV.
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WHERE IT ALL BEGAN—THE WAR ON DRUGS AND
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING LAWS

On October 2, 1982, approximately twenty-one months after becoming President, Ronald Reagan, with the help of his wife, First
Lady Nancy Reagan, gave an impassioned speech in a radio address to the nation.27 In this radio address, the First Lady reported
the drug epidemic was destroying the lives of children and causing
consternation in families across the United States.28 In response,
President Reagan promised a new strategy to address the drug
crisis.29 President Reagan then followed with a jarring message to
drug traffickers, “[You] can run but [you] can’t hide.”30
President Reagan made good on his “tough on drug criminals”
promise to the American public.31 During his tenure, Americans
witnessed and experienced the passage of sentencing laws that
gave rise to the mass incarceration of first-time, low-level, and
nonviolent drug offenders.32 As a result, the Reagan Administration gave life to the rhetorical term coined by President Nixon—

27 See President Ronald Reagan & First Lady Nancy Reagan, Radio Address to the
Nation on Federal Drug Policy (Oct. 2, 1982) (transcript available at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/100282a.
28 See id. Nancy Reagan informed the public that children were stealing from their parents to support their drug habit, and that alcohol and drug use was one of the primary
causes of the increased death rate among adolescents and young adults. See id.
29 See id.
30 Id. President Reagan also said: “We’re not just going to let them go somewhere else;
we’re going to be on their tail.” Id. At the time of this address, President Reagan had already
established a task force in south Florida under Vice President Bush’s leadership. Id. The
accomplishments of this task force included an increase in the number of judges, prosecutors, law enforcement personnel, and the use of military radar and intelligence to detect
drug traffickers. Id. President Reagan planned to implement a similar strategy on the federal level. See id. (stating President Reagan planned to implement the strategy used to
handle the drug crisis in Florida throughout the United States).
31 See Sarah Childress, Michelle Alexander: “A System of Racial and Social Control”,
FRONTLINE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/michelle-alexander-a-system-of-racial-and-social-control (stating that President Reagan fulfilled his promise to the public of getting tough on criminals by declaring a war on drugs).
32 See Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 44
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1065-66 (2016) (explaining that the passage of harsh sentencing
guidelines caused an increase in incarceration rate). “During the 1980s, the Reagan administration declared a war on drugs. Nancy Reagan introduced her ‘Just Say No’ campaign,
and the administration launched a law enforcement strategy that resulted in an exponential increase in federal prisoners and unprecedented racial disparities in the prison population.” Id. at 1065. “Between 1980 and 2007, there were more than twenty-five million
adult drug arrests in the United States.” Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement
in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 271 (2009).
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the War on Drugs.33 In fact, “President Reagan turned the rhetorical war into a literal one when he officially announced the War on
Drugs in 1982.”34 What quickly followed were two important
pieces of legislation.
A. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), one of the “most
broad reaching reform[s] of federal sentencing,” created the U.S.
Sentencing Commission (“Commission”) and mandatory minimum
sentence guidelines (“Guidelines”).35 The Commission intended to
correct disparate sentencing of similarly situated defendants, and
structure, rather than eliminate, judicial discretion.36 Judges
could exercise discretion so long as the imposed sentence did not
overstep the overarching purposes of the SRA and could only depart from the Guidelines if there were aggravating or mitigating
33 See Danielle Snyder, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Look at the Disproportionate Effects
Of Federal Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences On Racial Minorities And How They Have
Contributed To The Degradation Of The Underprivileged African-American Family, 36
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 78, 90 n.54 (2015) (explaining that when President Nixon used
the term, it was largely rhetorical because he did not propose any significant changes to
public policy).
34 Id.
35 See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 NW. U. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 883-84 (1990) (explaining that the
Sentencing Reform Act contributed to the creation of the Commission); 28 U.S.C.S. § 991(a)
(LexisNexis 2019) (“There is established as an independent commission in the judicial
branch of the United States a United States Sentencing Commission which shall consist of
seven voting members and one nonvoting member.”); see also David M. Zlotnick, The War
within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57
SMU L. REV. 211, 216 (2004) (explaining that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 mandated
the creation of mandatory minimum guidelines, abolished parole and required prisoners to
serve at least 85% of their sentences). In 1987 the Sentencing Commission released the
Sentencing Guidelines to be applied prospectively. See id. at 216-17. The Guidelines attributed a base level offense to every offense in the U.S. Code that correlated with a specific
punishment range; the base level offense was raised or lowered based on additional considerations. See id. at 217. Points were added for prior convictions and the points determined
the defendant’s criminal history category. See id. The criminal history category determined
the mandatory sentencing range. See id. Judges were allowed to “depart” from the sentencing range, but all “departures” were subject to judicial review. Id. at 217-18.
36 See 28 U.S.C.S. § 991(b)(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2019) (stating the purposes of the Commission are to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records and maintain flexibility for individualized sentences); see also Nagel, supra note 35,
at 883 (stating the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was to attack problems of
dishonesty—where the court-imposed sentences did not reflect actual time served, excessively lenient sentences, and unfettered judicial discretion).
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factors that had not already been calculated into the Guidelines
formula.37 In addition, courts were still expected to impose sentences based on the gravity of the offense, with the additional purposes of deterring criminal behavior, protecting the public, and rehabilitating the accused.38 The result was that departures from
the Guidelines were unavailable in most cases because the Commission had already accounted for all relevant factors in its formula.39
Two years after the SRA, Nancy Reagan delivered her famous
“Just Say No” speech to America.40 She told her adolescent listeners to “just say no” when confronted with the temptation to use
drugs or drink alcohol.41 During this radio address, President
Reagan reported the successes of the War on Drugs.42 However,
he declared there was still much work to be done because the illegal sale and use of crack-cocaine posed a new threat to societal and
human well-being, and he vowed to implement more stringent
drug sentencing laws.43
The American zeal to stamp out crack-cocaine use had begun
with the recent death of college basketball star, Len Bias.44 Three
months before the Reagans’ speeches, the media erroneously
37 See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235 (2005) (stating departure from Guidelines is
appropriate where aggravating or mitigating circumstances were not adequately taken into
consideration by Commission); see also Nagel, supra note 35, at 902 (explaining that “sentencing judges were instructed to review the following: 1) the nature of the offense and
history of the offender; 2) the kinds of sentences available; 3) the guidelines to be developed
by the United States Sentencing Commission; and 4) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity.”).
38 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2018).
39 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 234.
40 See generally ‘Just Say No’, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2004/reagan/stories/speech.archive/just.say.no.html (last
visited Dec. 30, 2019) (explaining that Nancy Reagan delivered the campaign against drug
use in 1986).
41 See id. (stating that the message was aimed at young people).
42 See id. (noting the administration’s achievements, such as 10,000 convicted drug offenders and $250 million in drug-related assets seized by the Drug Enforcement Administration).
43 See id. (explaining that illegal cocaine was causing an epidemic that was harming its
users, and that his administration “still [had] much to do” to prevent its spread); see also
Gerald M. Boyd, Reagan Proposes Stiffer Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 1986),
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/16/us/reagan-proposes-stiffer-drug-laws.html (explaining implementation of stringent drug sentencing laws by President Reagan, such as capital
punishment for drug crimes, and drug testing programs).
44 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Astead W. Herndon, ‘Lock the S.O.B.s Up’: Joe Biden
and the Era of Mass Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/us/joe-biden-crime-laws.html.
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reported that Bias had died from a crack-cocaine overdose, when
he, in fact, died of a cocaine overdose.45 The erroneous media reporting amplified public and congressional awareness of crack-cocaine in the drug market, and the legislative response to this socalled “national hysteria” was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
(“ADAA”).46
Congress passed the ADAA without Senate committee hearings,
without seeking recommendations from the judicial branch, and
with minimal input from law enforcement agencies.47 The ADAA
represented a significant departure from the previous sentencing
guidelines48 as it instituted mandatory minimum sentences based
on the quantity of the controlled or counterfeit substance.49
The ADAA also shifted discretion from judges to prosecutors. 50
Prosecutors were given the power to charge crimes that would not
trigger a mandatory minimum for defendants who provided substantial assistance in the same or a different investigation.51 It
follows that low-level drug offenders, like Alice Marie Johnson,
who could not provide substantial assistance received the short
end of the stick because they “often had no one to ‘rat out,’ or they
waited too long to come forward out of ignorance, loyalty, or fear

45 See Spencer A. Stone, Federal Drug Sentencing-What Was Congress Smoking? The
Uncertain Distinction Between “Cocaine” and “Cocaine Base” in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 297, 311, 313 (2007); see also Lis Wiehl, “Sounding Black” in
the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial Stereotyping, 18 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 185,
206-07 (2000).
46 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207 (1986);
see also Zlotnick, supra note 35, at 218 (explaining that Len Bias’s death “spiked a growing
national hysteria over crack cocaine and Congress fell into an anti-drug frenzy [and] [t]he
result was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986”).
47 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207; Zlotnick,
supra note 35, at 218-19; Stone, supra note 45, at 316 (noting that the ADAA was signed
into law shortly after the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee introduced the Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act, House Bill 5394, on August 12, 1986,
and President Reagan transmitted his Drug Free America Act to Congress on September
15, 1986).
48 See generally Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
49 See Zlotnick, supra note 35, at 219. Consequently, if the Guidelines sentence resulted
in a lower sentence than the mandatory minimum, then the Guidelines sentence was adjusted to match the mandatory minimum sentence. Id.
50 Id. at 219-20.
51 Id. at 220 (“Without a ‘substantial assistance’ motion by the U.S. Attorney’s Office,
judges were powerless to sentence below the mandatory minimum even if the judge felt the
defendant had made a good faith effort to cooperate.”).
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. . . while higher-ups in the same drug network cooperated in exchange for lesser sentences.”52
B. The Fair Sentencing Act
The first sign of meaningful sentencing reform came in 2005.53
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court dispensed with the
Guidelines’ mandatory minimum sentences and held that the
Guidelines were effectively advisory, permitting courts to depart
from Guidelines’ sentences in consideration of other criteria.54 The
Court’s primary rationale was that the Guidelines conflicted with
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when judges applied the
Guidelines’ mandatory minimum based on post-trial evidentiary
determinations.55 Accordingly, Sixth Amendment challenges to
the Guidelines’ applications would be moot if the Guidelines were
advisory rather than mandatory.56 The Court stated its holding
was necessary to preserve congressional intent for the SRA because, in conjunction with other points, the statutory goal of the
Guidelines was to diminish disparate sentencing which may require judicial inquiry and if Congress had considered the Sixth
Amendment constitutional requirement it would not have made
the Guidelines mandatory.57 However, the significance of this

52 Id. Prosecutorial discretion is subject to the worldview of the prosecutor and charging
decisions on the front-end create a snowball effect in the criminal justice system. See Telephone Interview with Anna-Bo Chung Emmanuel, Former Florida Prosecutor (Oct. 8,
2019). Therefore, we need “justice-minded” prosecutors who review defendants’ circumstances holistically and who are not intent on feeding the prison system. See id. Justice
must account for everyone affected by the crime including the victim and the accused and
family and loved ones on both sides. See id.
53 Robert L. Boone, Booker Defined: Examining the Application of United States v.
Booker in the Nation’s Most Divergent Circuit Courts, 95 CAL. L. R EV. 1079, 1080 (2007).
54 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (detailing that a judge could consider the (i) nature
and circumstances; (ii) retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and public safety; (iii) availability of different sentencing schemes; (iv) the sentences and ranges applicable to the offense and the defendant; (v) criminal justice policies; (vi) disparate sentencing among similarly situated defendants; and (vii) restitution); U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 266 (2005);
see also Davis, supra note 32, at 1069.
55 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 223. Defendants like Booker had “no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deem[ed] relevant” and challenged their mandatory minimum sentence on this premise. Id. at 233.
56 See id. at 222.
57 Id. at 227.
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holding did not affect the federal mandatory minimums, only the
Guidelines.58
There was more change when President Barack Obama signed
the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) in 2010 which did affect federal
mandatory minimums.59 The FSA caused a dramatic shift in the
charging and sentencing regimes for crack-cocaine offenses by increasing the quantity of crack-cocaine that triggered the mandatory minimums.60 The FSA specifically sought to correct the sentencing disparities between crack-cocaine and powder cocaine
offenses.61 The FSA also repealed the mandatory five-year minimum sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine to come into
conformity with the misdemeanor penalty for simple possession of
other controlled substances.62
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) explained the FSA was only
applied prospectively to offense conduct that occurred after the
FSA was signed into law; offense conduct that occurred before the
FSA was enacted, even if the case was charged after enactment,
was still subject to previous triggering quantities for crack-

58 See Sentencing 101, FAMM, https://famm.org/our-work/sentencing-reform/sentencing-101/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2020) (explaining that federal mandatory minimums are set
by Congress mostly apply to drug offenses, whereas, the Guidelines guide judges toward a
sentence based on the facts that led to a conviction. The Guidelines normally come into
play when the quantity of drugs is too low to trigger the federal mandatory minimum because a federal mandatory minimum always trumps a Guidelines sentence).
59 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010);
Jesse Lee, President Obama signs the Fair Sentencing Act, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 3, 2010,
4:58 P.M.), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/08/03/president-obama-signsfair-sentencing-act.
60 See David Bjerk, Mandatory Minimums and the Sentencing of Federal Drug Crimes,
46 J. LEG. STUD. 93, 94 (2017); Snyder, supra note 33, at 101-02.
61 See Bjerk, supra note 60, at 94; see also Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy Attorney General, on the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to all federal prosecutors (Aug. 5, 2010) (on file with the Department of Justice), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/fair-sentencing-act-memo.pdf. In
quantitative terms, the FSA reduced the sentencing disparity between crack and powder
cocaine offenses from 100:1 to 18:1. Id. The triggering quantities for crack-cocaine were
increased from 5 grams and 50 grams to 28 grams and 280 grams to trigger the respective
5 and 10-year mandatory minimum sentences. Id. The powder cocaine triggering quantity
remained unchanged. See Snyder, supra note 33, at 100-02.
62 Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, supra note 61; see Sarah Hyser, Two Steps
Forward, One Step Back: How Federal Courts Took the “Fair” Out of the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 503, 509 (2012). Simple possession occurs “when [a defendant] is arrested for having a relatively small quantity of drugs on his person that is
presumably for personal use and not for distribution.” Id. at 508. “Simple possession of
other controlled substances by a first-time offender—including powder cocaine—is a misdemeanor offense punishable by a maximum of one year in prison.” Id. at 509.
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cocaine.63 However, the DOJ stated the Commission was not foreclosed from promulgating Guidelines amendments that retroactively applied the FSA.64
The application of the FSA to crack-cocaine offenders was far
from simple and its difficulties implicated two types of defendants.65 Those implicated were (i) defendants whose offense conduct
occurred before the FSA was enacted but were not yet sentenced—
“pipeline cases”—and (ii) defendants who were sentenced under
prior sentencing Guidelines, including those who had appealed
their cases and were currently serving time in prison—"pre-FSA
sentences.”66 There was general consensus among courts and the
DOJ that the FSA did not apply retroactively to the latter category
of defendants.67 However, the Courts of Appeals were split on the
issue of whether the FSA should be applied to pipeline cases.68 The
First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits ruled in favor of applying the
FSA to pipelines cases, and the DOJ supported this holding.69 The
Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, however, ruled against applying the FSA to pipeline cases.70
There was some resolution to the tension over the pipelines
cases (i.e. category (i) defendants) and pre-FSA sentences (i.e. category (ii) defendants) when both the Commission and the Supreme
Court took action.71 In 2011, the Commission made clear that
“[o]nly Congress can make a statute retroactive” and effect change
for pre-FSA sentences.72 The DOJ followed suit and affirmed this
63
64
65
66
67

See Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, supra note 61.
See id.
See Hyser, supra note 62, at 515.
See id.
See id.; see also Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Attorney General, on the application of the statutory mandatory minimum sentencing laws for crack offenses amended
by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to all federal prosecutors (July 15, 2011) (on file with
the Department of Justice), https://www.justice.gov/oip/ag_memo_application_statutory_mandatory_sentencing_laws_amended_fair_sentencing_act_2010/download.
68 See Hyser, supra note 62, at 515-16.
69 See id. at 516.
70 See id.
71 See id. at 506, 523-24 (describing that the “United Supreme Court resolved the circuit
split[] [by] finding that defendants sentenced after the FSA’s passage should be subject to
the new minimums regardless of when their crime occurred.”).
72 See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission, U.S. Sentencing Commission
Votes Unanimously To Apply Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 Amendment To The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Retroactively (June 30, 2011) (available at
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20110630_Press_Release.pdf).
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position.73 In 2012, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in
a 5-4 decision holding pipeline cases should be sentenced based on
the FSA mandatory minimums, regardless of when the conduct
occurred.74 In contrast, the Court did not help pre-FSA sentences,
and Congress failed to make the FSA retroactive.75 Retroactive application of the FSA would have decreased the number of inmates
incarcerated in federal prison and corrected long-standing sentencing disparities.76
II. PROBLEMS WITH MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES
Without question, Ronald Reagan’s War on Drugs “transformed
the landscape of the criminal justice system.”77 The undeniable result is the mass incarceration of America, where “[l]ow-level and
marginally culpable drug defendants with no information to trade
have received very harsh sentences based upon broad definitions
of conspiracy and weight-based penalty schemes.”78
Ronald Reagan’s War on Drugs has cost the United States an
estimated $1 trillion since its inception,79 led to the United States
73 See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, supra note 67.
74 See Hyser, supra note 62, at 523.
75 See Jeremy Haile, Farewell, Fair Cruelty: An Argument for Retroactive Relief in Fed-

eral Sentencing, 47 U. TOL. L. Rev. 635, 640 (2016) (arguing fairness is one of the cornerstone principles of retroactivity, and that two defendants who are charged with the same
offense should not be given different punishments merely because they were sentenced on
different dates).
76 See id. at 641. Conversely, opponents of retroactivity are concerned the retroactive
application of sentencing reform imposes an undue burden on the judiciary, unsettles court
judgments when cases are reopened, and overrides the separation of powers doctrine. See
id. at 645-47.
77 Zlotnick, supra note 35, at 211.
78 Id. at 212; see also Raishad Hardnett, The Prisoners Left Behind, CANNABIS WIRE
(Sept. 7, 2018, 6:50 A.M.), https://cannabiswire.com/2018/09/07/the-prisoners-left-behind/;
Mark W. Bennett, A Slow Motion Lynching? The War on Drugs, Mass Incarceration, Doing
Kimbrough Justice, and A Response to Two Third Circuit Judges, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 873,
883 (2014). Mass incarceration indiscriminately affects communities of color. See Haile, supra note 75, at 637 (“It is well known that African Americans, in particular, have borne the
greatest burden of the nation’s four-decade long experiment with mass incarceration. Black
men are incarcerated at a rate six times greater than white men and black women at a rate
twice that of white women.”). Mass incarceration disrupts the familial unit and perpetuates
violent and criminal conduct within African American and Latino communities. See Aimée
Tecla Canty, Note, A Return to Balance: Federal Sentencing Reform After the “Tough-onCrime” Era, 44 S TETSON L. REV. 893, 894 (2015).
79 See Betsy Pearl, Ending the War on Drugs: By the Numbers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(June 27, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2018/06/27/452819/ending-war-drugs-numbers/.
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having the highest incarceration rate in the world,80 and helped
create a federal prison system that houses more inmates than any
individual state.81 From the 1950s to the mid 1970s, the federal
and state prison population combined remained constant at
around 200,000 inmates (plus or minus a few thousand).82 After
the inception of the War on Drugs, the prison population increased
steadily until 2010 (with a small decline between 2010 and
2014).83 On the broad scale, from 1974 to 2014, the total combined
prison population increased from 218,466 to 1,508,636; from 1980
to 2014 the number of incarcerated drug offenders increased from
41,000 to 488,400.84 In 2016, approximately 2.2 million Americans
were incarcerated.85
The general consensus is that the War on Drugs is the dominant
cause of the increase in the prison population.86 The numbers support the assertion that a plethora of criminal offenders who were
sentenced under the SRA and ADAA for first-time, low-level, and
nonviolent offenses, like Alice Marie Johnson, are still in prison.87
Plus, the Commission has confirmed that “[m]andatory minimum
penalties continue to significantly impact the size and composition
of the federal prison population.”88
The enactment of the FSA and the repeal of other mandatory
minimum sentences drove a decrease in the federal prison
80 See Tyjen Tsai & Paola Scommegna, U.S. Has World’s Highest Incarceration Rate,
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.prb.org/us-incarceration/;
see also Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130
HARV. L. REV. 811, 816 (2017) (noting America incarcerates more people “than the top
thirty-five European countries combined, and dwarfs [the incarceration rate of] not only
other Western allies but also countries like Russia and Iran”).
81 See JENNIFER BRONSON & ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2017 4 (2019).
82 See Lauren Carroll, How the war on drugs affected incarceration rates, POLITIFACT
(July 10, 2016, 6:27 P.M.), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jul/10/cory-booker/how-war-drugs-affected-incarceration-rates/.
83 Id.
84 See id. (noting this increase represents a 600 percent and 1,000 percent increase,
respectively).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See Davis, supra note 32, at 1070.
88 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES: 2017
OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (REPORT AT A GLANCE) (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/backgrounders/RG-mm-overview.pdf (reporting that, in 2016,
“slightly more than half (55.7%; N=92,870) of federal inmates in custody were convicted of
an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty”).
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population and contributed to lesser federal drug convictions
based on mandatory minimums.89 The Commission reported in
both 2015 and 2017 respectively that (i) “the FSA . . . reduced the
federal prison population, and appears to have resulted in fewer
federal prosecutions for crack cocaine,”90 and (ii) “[o]f the 19,584
drug offenders sentenced in fiscal year 2016, less than one-half
(46.8%) were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.”91 However, mandatory minimums are still woven
into the framework of the criminal justice system.92 The average
sentence of the federal drug offenders convicted of a mandatory
minimum in 2016 was 125 months, while the average sentence of
federal drug offenders not convicted of a mandatory minimum was
39 months because their offense did not carry a mandatory minimum penalty.93 Consequently, drug offenders sentenced based on
federal mandatory minimums are serving longer sentences than
their counterparts who are relieved from mandatory minimums.94
When Ms. Johnson was released from federal prison in 2018, she
stated the current sentencing system must be reexamined.95 She
told Hill T.V., “[t]hese mandatory minimums must be struck down
. . . [t]here must never be a time that a non-violent first offender
like myself can receive the harshest sentence next to the death
penalty. . .life without the possibility of parole.”96 President
Obama echoed these sentiments in his 2017 Harvard Law Review
article when he stated,

89 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES
IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 22 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/de-

fault/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/20170711_MandMin.pdf#page=15.
90 Id.
91 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quickfacts/Quick_Facts_Mand_Mins_FY16.pdf.
92 See id. (explaining that 13.4% of all federal offenders in 2016 were subject to a mandatory minimum penalty).
93 See id. (comparing rates at which crack cocaine and marijuana offenders were subjected to mandatory minimum sentences—71.4% and 33.6%, respectively).
94 See id.
95 See Julia Manchester, Alice Marie Johnson: Mandatory minimum sentences must be
struck down, HILL (July 19, 2018), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/397849-alice-marie-johnson-mandatory-minimums-must-be-struck-down.
96 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “No other developed nation sentences nonviolent offenders to life without the possibility of parole. In fact, most nations have even removed such harsh sentences for violent offenders.” King, supra note 17.
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[e]very dollar that the Department of Justice spends on excessive sentences for nonviolent drug offenses represents a
dollar we don’t have for investigating emerging threats,
from hackers to home-grown terrorists. And it’s a dollar we
don’t have to support state and local law enforcement with
more cops on the street and crucial programs for prevention, intervention and reentry.97
The impact of the mass incarceration of first-time, low-level, and
nonviolent drug offenders in America has proved to be counterproductive.98 A 2014 study by Peter Reuter at the University of Maryland and Harold Pollack at the University of Chicago concluded
that harsh sentences or supply-elimination efforts are no more effective at decreasing accessibility to narcotics and substance abuse
than lighter penalties.99 Harsh penalties, such as mandatory minimum sentences, may have some effect on curbing the illegal drug
market, but that effect is negligible.100 Other research revealed
draconian sentencing laws do not deter crime and tend to increase
the likelihood of criminal conduct after release.101 In other words,
“prison can exacerbate, not reduce, recidivism [and] [p]risons
themselves may be schools for learning to commit crimes.”102
III. THE CLEMENCY POWER AND ITS ROLE IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. An Introduction to Clemency
The clemency power is a constitutional grant.103 Under Article
II of the Constitution, the President “shall have power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,
97 Obama, supra note 80, at 818 (quoting Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98 See German Lopez, The new war on drugs, VOX (Sept. 13, 2017, 7:50 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/5/16135848/drug-war-opioid-epidemic (describing that harsh sentencing policies for nonviolent drug offenders has not worked in the
past and those same policies are still not working for the current opioid epidemic).
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See Five Things About Deterrence, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (June 5, 2016),
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/five-things-about-deterrence.
102 Id.
103 See U.S. CONST . art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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except in Cases of Impeachment.”104 The clemency grant is rooted
in the Framers’ beliefs that the “nation’s chief executive should be
able . . . to ameliorate miscarriages of justice.”105
The clemency power is exercised in the form of pardons, commutations, remissions, reprieves, or amnesty.106 Clemency is often a
last resort tool to correct unjust criminal sentences; the Supreme
Court referred to the clemency power as the “fail safe” in the American criminal justice system.107 The President has broad discretion
to exercise the clemency power however and whenever he or she
sees fit,108 and the power is not subject to judicial or congressional
review.109 Even so, the Framers assumed the President would neither abuse this power, nor use it frivolously and mindlessly.110
With that said, how a President uses the clemency power may inform the public of his criminal justice policies.111
Historically, the use of the clemency power has waxed and
waned with each administration.112 Some presidents, like “George
Washington and John Adams did not use their power

104 Id.
105 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., “A Day Late and A Dollar Short”—President Obama’s Clem-

ency Initiative 2014, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 148 (2018) [hereinafter Larkin, A Day
Late and A Dollar Short].
106 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Revitalizing the Clemency Process, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 833, 846 (2016) [hereinafter Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process]. Pardon is
defined as “a release from the penalty of an offense” or a “forgiveness of a serious offense
or offender.” Pardon, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/pardon (last
visited Nov. 23, 2018). Commutation is defined as “the changing of a prison sentence or
other penalty to another less severe.” Commutation, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/commutation (last visited Nov. 23, 2018). Reprieve is defined as “to
delay the impending punishment or sentence of (a condemned person).” Reprieve,
DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/reprieve (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
Amnesty is defined as “a general pardon for offenses, especially political offenses, against
a government, often granted before any trial or conviction” or “an act of forgiveness for
past offenses, especially to a class of persons as a whole.” Amnesty, DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/amnesty (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
107 See Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process, supra note 106, at 841 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993)).
108 See id. at 847-48.
109 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Proposal to Restructure the Clemency Process—the Vice
President as Head of a White House Clemency Office, 40 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 237
(2017) [hereinafter Larkin, Vice President as Head of a White House Clemency Office].
110 See Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process, supra note 106, at 848.
111 See Larkin, Vice President as Head of a White House Clemency Office, supra note
109.
112 See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
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vigorously.”113 Others, such as “Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, and John Quincy Adams did.”114 The Presidents that served between 1961 and 1981 issued an average of 150
pardons annually.115 However, the Reagan-era and beyond
marked a decline in clemency grants.116 Between 1980 and 2010,
the number of federal prosecutions and clemency requests increased exponentially, “reflecting lengthier sentences and the
elimination of parole for federal inmates,” while the number of
clemency grants declined proportionally to the point where a successful clemency application seemed like “luck of draw” rather
than the outcome of a predictable process.117 Both President
Ronald Reagan and President Bill Clinton granted one in 100
clemency petitions.118 President George W. Bush granted one in
1,000.119
B. Clemency in Focus
The Pardon Attorney and Deputy Attorney General (operating
out of the Office of the Pardon Attorney (“OPA”)) are responsible
for facilitating and overseeing the clemency process and making

113 See Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process, supra note 106, at 853. George Washington and John Adams granted 16 and 21 pardons/commutations respectively. See List of
people pardoned or granted clemency by the president of the United States, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_people_pardoned_or_granted_clemency_by_the_president_of_the_United_States (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
114 See Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process, supra note 106, at 853. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, and John Quincy Adams granted 119, 196, 419, and
183 pardons/commutations respectively. See List of people pardoned or granted clemency by
the president of the United States, supra note 113.
115 See Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process, supra note 106, at 855.
116 See id. at 854. “The clemency grant rate dropped by almost half from President
Carter (twenty-two percent) to President Reagan (twelve percent), and by more than half
again from President Reagan to President George H.W. Bush (five percent).” Id. at 855. The
average pardons/commutations from the Reagan Administration (1981) through the Bush
Administration (2009) equaled 285.5 (ranging from a low of 77 pardons/commutations issued by George H.W. Bush to a high of 459 pardons/commutations issued by Bill Clinton).
See List of people pardoned or granted clemency by the president of the United States, supra
note 113.
117 See Dafna Linzer, Pardon Attorney Torpedoes Plea for Presidential Mercy,
PROPUBLICA (May 13, 2012, 7:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/pardon-attorneytorpedoes-plea-for-presidential-mercy; see also Obama, supra note 80, at 836.
118 See Linzer, supra note 117.
119 See id.

JOHNSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

402

JRNL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

9/21/20 2:30 PM

[Vol. 33:3

clemency recommendations to the President.120 At the core of the
clemency process, the Deputy Attorney General is given broad latitude to decide which criteria to use in a clemency investigation
and makes judgements on the fate of a clemency petition.121
President George W. Bush’s Pardon Office “was given wide latitude to apply subjective standards, including judgments about the
‘attitude’ and the marital and financial stability of applicants.”122
In 2011, ProPublica and the Washington Post reported that under
the Bush Administration, white petitioners with similar criminal
records to black petitioners were four times more likely to be
granted clemency.123 Many of these white petitioners made campaign contributions to lawmakers who would garner congressional
support for their clemency petitions.124
The propensity of the Pardon Attorney and the Deputy Attorney
General towards “subconscious bias” and partiality did not evade
the Obama Administration.125 Ronald Rodgers was appointed as
the Pardon Attorney by President Obama in 2008,126 and he also
favored whites when he made clemency recommendations.127 As a
matter of fact, Rodgers brought into plain view “the extraordinary,
secretive powers wielded by the Office of the Pardon Attorney”
120 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-140.110 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-140000-pardon-attorney#9-140.112 [hereinafter JUSTICE MANUAL]; see
also 28 C.F.R. § 0.36 (2019) (explaining that the Pardon Attorney works under the direction
of the Deputy Attorney General, and receives and reviews all petitions for executive clemency, initiates and directs the necessary investigations, and prepares a report and recommendation for submission to the President). The Pardon Attorney may seek information
and insight from the prosecuting United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney General.
See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 120, at § 9-140.111 (“The views of the United States Attorney and Assistant Attorney General are given considerable weight in determining what
recommendations the Department should make to the President.”).
121 See 28 C.F.R. § 1.6 (2019) (showing the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General may utilize reports and services of various governmental agencies and advise the President whether to grant or deny a petition).
122 Dafner Linzer & Jennifer LaFleur, Presidential Pardons Heavily Favor Whites,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 3, 2011, 11:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/shades-of-mercypresidential-forgiveness-heavily-favors-whites.
123 See Linzer, supra note 117.
124 See Linzer & LaFleur, supra note 122.
125 See Law, supra note 4 (explaining that “white people were four times more likely to
be pardoned than people of color” under President Obama’s U.S. Pardon Attorney, Ronald
Rodgers). The term “subconscious bias” was used by Kenneth Lee, “the lawyer who shepherded [Clarence] Aaron’s case on behalf of the White House,” when discussing Ronald
Rodgers’ indiscretions. See Linzer, supra note 117.
126 See Linzer, supra note 117.
127 See Law, supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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when he omitted critical information in recommending the denial
of the clemency petition of an African American college student
who was serving three life sentences.128 “Rodgers failed to accurately convey the views of the prosecutor and judge, and did not
disclose they had advocated for [the student’s] immediate commutation.”129
Due to his indiscretions, Ronald Rodgers was removed from office in 2014, and Deborah Leff assumed his role.130 Soon after, the
Obama Administration launched the Clemency Initiative.131 Perhaps President Obama’s motivation to launch the Clemency Initiative, even if in part, was to remedy Rodgers’ failures. Yet, a real
concern with the clemency process is its vulnerability to inherent
(or subconscious) biases.132 Thus, it is surprising that President
Obama chose to administer the Clemency Initiative through the
OPA, given its deficiencies.133 Mary Price, Vice President of Families Against Mandatory Minimums, stated “[t]he chief impediment [to clemency] lies in the pardon attorney’s office.”134 Other
legal scholars have supported moving the OPA out of the DOJ because the OPA’s functions in granting pardons and commutations
may create a conflict of interest with federal prosecutors who put
the same petitioners in prison and function out of the same department as the OPA.135
C. President Barack Obama and the Clemency Initiative 2014
President Obama credited himself with reinvigorating the clemency power after he commuted the sentences of 1,696 federal

128 See Linzer, supra note 117; see also Law, supra note 4 (“Clarence Aaron, a Black
college student [was] serving three life sentences for being present during a drug deal.”).
129 Linzer, supra note 117.
130 See Dafna Linzer, Justice finally comes to the pardons office and perhaps to many
inmates, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/justice-finally-comes-the-pardons-office
(last updated Apr. 23, 2014, 2:19 PM).
131 See CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 17.
132 See Hardnett, supra note 78.
133 See infra Part III.C.
134 Linzer, supra note 117.
135 See Katie Benner, Pardon System Needs Fixing, Advocates Say, but They Cringe at
Trump’s Approach, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/us/politics/pardons-justice-department-trump.html.
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prisoners through his Clemency Initiative.136 According to President Obama, he “used [his] clemency power to a degree unmatched
in modern history to address unfairness in the federal system”137
and that he would “be the first President in decades to leave office
with a federal prison population lower than when [he] took office.”138 President Obama believes that his Clemency Initiative set
the stage for government to continue to exercise the clemency
power to benefit federal prisoners.139
The Clemency Initiative was an extension of the Obama Administration’s policy to ameliorate the consequences of harsh mandatory minimum sentencing laws.140 Eight months before the launch
of the Clemency Initiative, President Obama’s Attorney General,
Eric Holder, instructed prosecutors to refrain from charging defendants for drug quantities that triggered mandatory minimums
and to refrain from pursuing enhancements for low-level and nonviolent drug offenders who did not have a significant criminal history.141 Holder stated, “long sentences for low-level, non-violent
drug offenses do not promote public safety . . . [and] rising prison
costs have reduced spending on criminal justice initiatives.”142 The
DOJ stated President Obama would use his clemency power in an
aggressive and systematic way to correct sentencing injustices.143
The Clemency Initiative targeted nonviolent and low-level drug
offenders who would have received substantially lower sentences
under current sentencing guidelines, including pre-FSA
136 See Obama, supra note 80, at 838; CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL LAW, N.Y.
UNIV., THE MERCY LOTTERY: A REVIEW OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY
INITIATIVE 6 (2018), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/The%20Mercy%20Lottery.Report%20on%20Obama%20Clemency%20Initiative.2018.pdf [hereinafter Mercy Lottery].
137 Obama, supra note 80, at 824.
138 Id.; see also Larkin, Vice President as Head of a White House Clemency Office, supra
note 109 (“With the exception of President Barack Obama, who granted a large number of
commutations to drug offenders, over the past few decades chief executives have granted
clemency far less frequently than in years past.”).
139 See Obama, supra note 80, at 815.
140 See id. at 838.
141 See Memorandum from the Attorney General to the U.S. Attorneys and Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-chargingmandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf.
142 Id.
143 See Luke C. Beasley & William D. Ferraro, How the Obama Administration Used
Retroactivity to Advance Its Sentencing Priorities, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 259, 266
(2018).
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sentences.144 Specifically, applicants must have met most, if not
all, of the following eligibility criteria:
(i) They are currently serving a federal sentence in prison and,
by operation of law, likely would have received a substantially
lower sentence if convicted of the same offense(s) today;
(ii) They are non-violent, low-level offenders without significant
ties to large scale criminal organizations, gangs or cartels;
(iii) They have served at least 10 years of their prison sentence;
(iv) They do not have a significant criminal history;
(v) They have demonstrated good conduct in prison; and
(vi) They have had no history of violence prior to or during their
current term of imprisonment.145
Under the Clemency Initiative’s process, petitioners submitted
a completed eligibility survey for screening.146 Then, if a petitioner
appeared to meet the eligibility criteria, a pro bono attorney assisted the petitioner in filing an application with the OPA, and the
OPA reviewed the application and made recommendations to the
Deputy Attorney General.147 Subsequently, the Deputy Attorney
General reviewed the OPA’s recommendations and determined if
the White House Counsel’s Office should review the clemency recommendation.148
By and large, President Obama’s Clemency Initiative was unsuccessful.149 From the inception of the program in 2014 until
President Obama left office in 2019, approximately 24,000 federal
prisoners sought relief through the Clemency Initiative.150 The
DOJ made recommendations to the White House on 16,776 drug
offender clemency petitions but the majority of the recommendations were denials.151 At the end of President Obama’s second
144 See CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 17.
145 Id.; contra Mercy Lottery, supra note 136, at 27 (concluding only 5.1% of successful

clemency applicants met all six eligibility criteria).
146 See Mercy Lottery, supra note 136, at 23.
147 See id. at 23-24.
148 See id. at 24.
149 See id. at 3.
150 See id. at 3, 6.
151 See Clemency Initiative, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-initiative, (last updated Dec. 11, 2018); see also Liliana Segura, Obama’s Clemency
Problem – And Ours, INTERCEPT (Dec. 24, 2016, 9:31 AM),
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term, 7,881 clemency petitions were yet to be reviewed—including
3,469 pending petitions from drug offenders—and only 1,715 clemency petitions were granted through the Clemency Initiative.152
The Commission reported that many applicants seemed to meet
all of the Clemency Initiative’s eligibility criteria, but only three
percent of drug offenders were actually granted clemency through
the program.153 The Center on the Administration of Criminal
Law at NYU Law School (“NYU Law School”) stated that many
petitioners “were ideal candidates who were, for reasons unknown,
passed over by the [Clemency] Initiative.”154 For instance, Alice
Marie Johnson’s clemency petition was denied twice before the
launch of the Clemency Initiative and a third time by the Clemency Initiative.155
The NYU Law School suggested that the Clemency Initiative’s
poor results were attributable to several factors.156 First, the
Clemency Initiative was a bureaucratic maze that involved many
levels of review during the initial screening and application process before the OPA reviewed the clemency petition, and an additional six levels of review before the clemency petition reached
President Obama.157 Second, the Clemency Initiative’s eligibility
criteria was vulnerable to subjective review.158 For example, what
constituted a significant criminal history, history of violence, or a
low-level drug offense was undefined and left open to interpretation.159 This subjective analysis might have contributed to the
lengthy review process.160 Third, the Clemency Initiative was
overwhelmed by the large number of clemency petitions and

https://theintercept.com/2016/12/24/obamas-clemency-problem-and-ours/. In 2016, the
Intercept reported that President Obama rejected approximately 14,000 petitions and
that number likely increased between 2016 and 2017. See id.
152 See Clemency Initiative, supra note 152.
153 See Hardnett, supra note 78.
154 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136 at 3.
155 See Law, supra note 4; see also Johnson, supra note 2.
156 See OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136 at 3.
157 See id. at 24-25. There were up to five internal levels of review, and this was a timeconsuming process because the pro bono attorneys needed to track down hard copy presentence reports for some petitioners or request these reports from the Bureau of Prisons. Id.
The Clemency Initiative “estimated that it took an attorney an estimate of roughly 30 days
to complete a full applicant review.” Id.
158 See id. at 25.
159 See id.
160 See generally id.
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lacked resources.161 Deborah Leff resigned in January 2016 out of
frustration, because her office was asked to review thousands of
petitions with inadequate staffing.162 Fourth, clemency in general
does not mirror judicial transparency and this was a feature of the
Clemency Initiative.163 None of the actors involved in the Clemency Initiative provided a rationale for clemency denials and petitioners did not have the right to an appeal.164 Rather, “petitioners
and their attorneys [were] left to guess at reasons for the denial,”165 and “[t]he words ‘random’ and ‘lottery’ that had temporarily disappeared from conversations about clemency began to surface as soon as the grants were announced.”166
Yet, the problems with the Clemency Initiative stretched beyond
bureaucracy to issues of inherent (or subconscious bias) and the
perceived conflict between the DOJ and the OPA.167
A study by NYU Law School opined that the success of the Clemency Initiative was less likely because it was controlled by the
DOJ.168 Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates changed many of
Deborah Leff’s positive clemency recommendations to negative
and denied Leff access to the White House Counsel’s Office to explain her recommendations.169 It seems that Yates’ decisions were
influenced by her worldview where she believed that public safety
trumped early release of federal inmates and retroactive application of amended sentencing laws.170
In sum, President Obama attempted to use his clemency power
to achieve mass commutations, but the totality of his efforts left
161 See id. at 24.
162 See id. Nearly 10,000 petitions. See id.; see also Letter from Deborah Leff, Pardon

Att’y, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice
(Jan. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Deborah Leff Resignation Letter].
163 See OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136, at 22.
164 See id.; see also Hardnett, supra note 78.
165 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136, at 22.
166 Margaret Love, Clemency is Not the Answer (Updated), COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR. (July 17, 2015), https://ccresourcecenter.org/2015/07/17/clemency-is-not-the-answer-updated/.
167 See OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136, at 23-24.
168 See generally id. at 3.
169 See Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, 128
YALE L. J. F. 791, 807 (2019). “Leff said, ‘I believe that prior to making the serious and
complex decisions underlying clemency, it is important for the president to have a full set
of views.’” Id. See OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136, at 25;
see also Deborah Leff Resignation Letter, supra note 163.
170 See Hopwood, supra note 170, at 807-08; see also supra text accompanying note 52.
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thousands of petitioners in agony and hopeful that another president would be merciful.171
D. President Donald J. Trump’s Approach to Clemency
Despite media reporting that President Trump was reviving the
‘War on Drugs,’ his criminal justice policies and views on clemency
remained unclear in the early part of his term.172 Though President Trump expressed an interest in criminal justice reform, he
did not indicate whether he would revive President Obama’s Clemency Initiative or how exactly he would handle pre-FSA sentences.173 Further, the DOJ did not indicate whether clemency
was a priority for the Trump Administration, or the types of cases
that would be prioritized for clemency review.174 There was uncertainty among first-time, low-level, and nonviolent drug offenders
who were waiting in federal prison, including inmates who had
submitted clemency petitions during the Obama-era.175
The angst over criminal justice reform at the outset of President
Trump’s tenure stemmed from Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinding all prior DOJ policies that helped shape the Clemency Initiative.176 Sessions’ charge to federal prosecutors to “pursue the
most serious readily provable offense[s],” ran counter to President

171 See Hardnett, supra note 78.
172 See generally Sari Horwitz, How Jeff Sessions wants to bring back the war on drugs,

WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/howjeff-sessions-wants-to-bring-back-the-war-on-drugs/2017/04/08/414ce6be-132b-11e7-ada01489b735b3a3_story.html?utm_term=.783beb29119b.
173 See e.g. Van Jones, Kushner’s effort to sway Trump on prison reform is smart, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/11/opinions/criminal-justice-reform-trump-sessions-vanjones-opinion/index.html (last updated Jan. 11, 2018, 6:12 PM); see also Doug Baldwin et
al., N.F.L. Players to Trump: Here’s Whom You Should Pardon, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/trump-pardon-nfl-players.html?login=email&auth=login-email.
174 See Hardnett, supra note 78.
175 See Christopher Ingraham, It’s not just Alice Marie Johnson: Over 2,000 federal
prisoners are serving life sentences for nonviolent drug crimes, WASH. POST (June 6, 2018,
4:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/06/its-not-just-alicemarie-johnson-over-2000-federal-prisoners-are-serving-life-sentences-for-nonviolent-drugcrimes/?utm_term=.4459b505a503. As of 2016, 1,907 federal inmates were serving life sentences for nonviolent drug offenses, and 103 serving sentences of fifty years or more without
the possibility of parole. See id.
176 See supra texts accompanying notes 135-38.
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Obama’s criminal justice policies.177 Besides, Sessions did not provide any exceptions or additional considerations for first-time, lowlevel, and nonviolent drug offenders, except a general acknowledgement that federal prosecutors should exercise good judgment
when considering a departure from this new policy.178
Despite the uncertainty and concern, President Trump did exercise his clemency power in a limited number of circumstances,
granting seven pardons and commuting four prison sentences during the first year and a half of his presidency.179 Nevertheless,
President Trump’s approach to clemency was unconventional and
described as a solo act.180 President Trump bypassed the OPA and
the DOJ and pushed White House officials to submit names for
clemency consideration to him directly.181 A White House source
commented that the President is “doing it his way and he likes
seeing how quick the process has been.”182 Others criticized President Trump’s pardons as “scattershot, driven by television segments, celebrities, friends, and White House advisers who have
pressed their cases.”183
However, President Trump’s approach was not an anomaly.184
Amy Ralston Povah benefited from media outcry when President

177 Memorandum from the Attorney General on the Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download.
178 See id. In another memo to prosecutors, dated March 20, 2018, Sessions urged prosecutors to consider the death penalty for certain drug-related offenses in light of the opioid
epidemic. See Memorandum from the Attorney General on Guidance Regarding Use of Capital Punishment in Drug-Related Prosecutions (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1045036/download.
179 See Pardons Granted by President Donald Trump, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-president-donald-trump (last visited Dec.
29, 2019); see also Commutations Granted By President Donald Trump (2017 - Present),
U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/pardon/commutations-granted-president-donaldtrump-2017-present (last visited Dec. 29, 2019); see also John Santucci, Trump’s ‘solo act’
Push for Presidential Pardons Likely to Grow, WH officials say, ABC NEWS (June 7, 2018,
9:01 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/trumps-solo-act-push-presidential-pardons-growwh/story?id=55716257.
180 See generally Santucci, supra note 180.
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See Douglas A. Berman, Prez Trump reportedly “obsessed” with pardons and “may
sign a dozen or more in the next two months”, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (June 5, 2018), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2018/06/-prez-trump-reportedly-obsessed-with-parsons-and-may-sign-a-dozen-or-more-in-the-next-two-months.html; see also
Jensen, supra note 2.
184 See Law, supra note 4.
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Clinton, in 2000, commuted Povah’s twenty-four-year prison sentence.185 Povah was sentenced for her minimal involvement in her
husband’s large-scale ecstasy drug operation.186 Arkansas Senators and community members advocated for Povah, which caught
the attention of Glamour magazine in 1999,187 and the publicity
was instrumental in her release from prison a year later.188 Povah,
who is now the president of CAN-DO Foundation, concedes that
media publicity is important in the clemency process and she provides a platform to bring awareness to women seeking clemency
through the CAN-DO website, and fielding their stories to media
reporters.189
Moreover, both President Bush and President Obama relied
heavily on the DOJ, which proved ineffective at the least, and disastrous at the most.190 So, it is surprising that President Trump
was not applauded when he chose to sidestep this broken system.191 Also, President Trump’s approach is not farfetched considering former Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden believes
the “standards [for clemency] should come from the president
[and] not from the pardon’s office.”192 Furthermore, Gregory Craig,
who was President Obama’s White House Counsel, believes clemency petitions should be reviewed by “an independent commission
of former judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and representatives of faith-based groups. The commission would make recommendations directly to the President.”193
President Trump adopted a modified approach when he solicited
more names for pardons and commutations.194 White House Counsel Donald McGahn compiled a list of over 3,000 names sourced

185 See id.; see also Amy Ralston Povah, A presidential pardon saved my life. Here’s why
Obama should pardon hundreds more women, SPLINTER (Sept. 9, 2015, 12:56 PM),
https://splinternews.com/a-presidential-pardon-saved-my-life-heres-why-obama-sh1793850622.
186 See Law, supra note 4. Povah’s husband was sentenced to only six years because he
cooperated with authorities and informed them of Povah’s involvement. See id.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See id.; see also Povah, supra note 186.
190 See Linzer, supra note 122; see also supra Part III.A., III.B.
191 See generally Benner, supra note 135.
192 See Linzer, supra note 122.
193 See id.
194 See sources cited supra notes 190-93.
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from the CAN-DO Foundation and FAMM;195 Kim KardashianWest recommended other nonviolent criminals as possible candidates for clemency;196 and Alveda King, the niece of Martin Luther
King Jr., submitted the names of 100 inmates to the White
House.197 President Trump even invited suggestions from NFL
players in the midst of a protest against criminal and racial injustice and police brutality.198 However, for the latter part of 2018,
the White House remained mum concerning impending commutations or pardons.199 Perhaps President Trump had set his sights
on something greater and more effective—legislative reform.
IV. A BETTER SOLUTION—LEGISLATION
A. The First Step—The First Step Act
In 2015, Margaret Colgate Love, who served as the Pardon Attorney from 1990 to 1997, accurately predicted President Obama’s
commutations through the Clemency Initiative would not make a
significant dent in the number of inmates incarcerated in federal
prison because the Clemency Initiative’s objectives were too

195 See Douglas A. Berman, NY Gov closes out 2018 with clemency grants, SENT’G L. &
POL’Y (Dec. 31, 2018), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2018/12/ny-gov-closes-out-2018-with-clemency-grants.html; see also Steven Nelson,
MLK niece urges clemency ‘tidal wave’ after giving White House list of names, WASH.
EXAMINER (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/white-house/mlkniece-urges-clemency-tidal-wave-after-giving-white-house-list-of-names.
196 See Douglas A. Berman, “Kim Kardashian West pushes White House for more drug
sentence commutations”, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Jun. 14, 2018), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2018/06/kim-kardashian-west-pushes-whitehouse-for-more-drug-sentence-commutations.html.
197 See Nelson, supra note 196.
198 See Baldwin, supra note 174. The NFL players commended President Trump for
commuting Alice Marie Johnson’s sentence, but resisted the notion that a handful of pardons could correct systematic racial and criminal injustice. See id. According to the NFL
players “[t]hese injustices are so widespread as to seem practically written into our nation’s
DNA. We must challenge these norms, investigate the reasons for their pervasiveness and
fight with all we have to change them. That is what we, as football players, are trying to do
with our activism.” See id.; see also Gabriel Sherman, “He Hate, Hate, Hates It”: Sessions
Fumes as Kushner Gets Pardon Fever, VANITY FAIR (June 13, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/06/sessions-fumes-as-kushner-pushes-pardons. In June 2018, Vanity
Fair reported that Jared Kushner was “gearing up for a big pardon push.” See id.
199 See Pardons Granted by President Donald Trump, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-president-donald-trump (last visited Jan.
5, 2019).

JOHNSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

412

JRNL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

9/21/20 2:30 PM

[Vol. 33:3

voluminous to accomplish before Obama left office.200 Love accurately stated, “the problem of unjust sentences is simply too large
and too pervasive to deal with through the clemency mechanism.”201 Vanita Gupta, the former deputy legal director of the
American Civil Liberties Union, found some merit in the Clemency
Initiative, but believed executive clemency could not substitute for
sentencing reform.202 According to Gupta, clemency “[will not]
bring relief to everyone who should see relief . . . [a]nd it’s not going to change some of the laws.”203
The weaknesses of clemency means it will not correct the consequences of federal mandatory minimum sentences.204 Clemency is
too transient, unpredictable, and prone to inherent (or subconscious) biases.205 Clemency’s transient and unpredictable nature
flows out of the fact that clemency is a presidential power, and its
use changes with each administration.206 President Obama’s
Clemency Initiative was a discretionary policy, not a change in
law, meaning another administration with a different view regarding criminal justice is not obligated to continue President Obama’s
criminal justice policies.207 The stark differences in approach between President Obama’s and President Trump’s use of clemency
to affect federal prison sentences makes this concept clear.208 Love
agrees. She notes, “there are philosophical as well as institutional
and practical reasons why our justice system is built upon accountable judicial decision-making under statutory authority, and not
upon the unstructured and unexplained discretion of a president
exercising a plenary constitutional power.”209 The truth is that

200 See Love, supra note 167; see also Biography, L. OFF. MARGARET LOVE, http://pardonlaw.com/biography/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2019).
201 See Love, supra note 167.
202 See Kara Brandeisky, Three Things Obama’s New Clemency Initiative Doesn’t Do,
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 23, 2014, 6:15 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/three-thingsobamas-new-clemency-initiative-doesnt-do. Gupta believed that the Clemency Initiative’s
criteria was sensible and that the clemency tool had been grossly underutilized. See id.
203 Id.
204 See generally id.
205 See supra Part III; see also Larkin, Jr., supra note 105, at 869.
206 See supra Part III.
207 See Don Stemen, Beyond the War: The Evolving Nature of the U.S. Approach to
Drugs, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375 (2017).
208 See supra Part III.C-III.D.
209 See Love, supra note 167. Love argues that the use of clemency to correct unjust
sentences minimizes the role of judges and Congress in sentencing reform. See id.
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federal prisoners should not have to wait in limbo while a presidential administration determines whether and to what extent
clemency is a priority.
President Obama admitted the clemency power was not a substitute for legislative reform.210 He emphasized the “need to pass
meaningful sentencing reform. No number of commutations will
ever achieve lasting structural reform of our sentencing laws.”211
Two pieces of bipartisan legislation, the Smarter Sentencing Act
of 2013 and Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, were
proposed during President Obama’s tenure, but did not become
law.212 Jared Kushner had better success shortly after his appointment in the Trump Administration.213 Within a year-and-a-half,
Kushner presented the Former Incarcerated Reenter Society
Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person Act (“First Step
Act”) to Congress.214 The First Step Act was passed by the House
of Representatives in May 2018, but faced opposition in the Senate
on both sides of the aisle.215
The initial version of the First Step Act contemplated rehabilitation and increased funding for prison rehabilitative programs by
$250 million over five years and prioritized improving prison conditions and reducing recidivism.216 This version of the First Step
Act did not address mandatory minimum sentences or retroactively apply the FSA to adjust pre-FSA sentences.217 Some Democrats and Republicans opposed the First Step Act for this very reason—refusing to support a bill that did not include serious

210 See Obama, supra note 80, at 855-56.
211 Id.
212 See Smarter Sentencing Act, H.R. 3382, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Sentencing

Reform and Corrections Act, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015); see also Obama, supra note 80, at
855-56. The Smarter Sentencing Act and Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act were introduced during President Obama’s second term. See id.
213 See infra notes 215-16.
214 See German Lopez, Congress’s Prison Reform Bill, Explained, VOX,
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/22/17377324/first-step-act-prison-reformcongress (last updated May 22, 2018, 6:18 P.M.).
215 See First Step Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. (2018); see also Congress’s Prison Reform
Bill, Explained, supra note 215. The First Step Act was introduced to the House of Representatives on May 7, 2018, and the bill passed the House on May 22, 2018. See id.
216 See Congress’s Prison Reform Bill, Explained, supra note 215. The goal of the rehabilitative programs was to facilitate federal inmates early release. See id.
217 See supra Part I.
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sentencing reform.218 The bill was amended in November 2018
and broadened to include both prison and sentencing reform.219
The amended bill amassed “the support of pivotal Republicans and
Democrats in Congress, President Donald Trump’s senior White
House advisors, and advocacy groups including the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, and law enforcement
groups.”220 The First Step Act was signed into law in late December 2018.221
The sections of the First Step Act that directly impact first-time,
low-level, and nonviolent drug offenders are: (i) section 402—the
prospective expansion of the safety valve, which allows courts to
depart from mandatory minimums when sentencing drug offenders;222 (ii) section 102(b)—prerelease custody in the form of retroactive application of the new ‘good time credits’ formula;223 and

218 See Congress’s Prison Reform Bill, Explained, supra note 215. Democratic Senators
Cory Booker (NJ), Dick Durbin (IL), and Kamala Harris (CA) vehemently opposed the bill
and urged other Democratic Senators to vote against it. See id. Republican Senate Judiciary
Chair Chuck Grassley (R-IA), also opposed the bill because it did not include sentencing
reform. See id.
219 See New Compromise on Federal Criminal Justice Reform Should Be Priority for
Congress, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/new-compromise-federal-criminal-justice-reform-should-be-priority.
220 See id.; see also Congress’s Prison Reform Bill, Explained, supra note 215.
221 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
222 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (f) (2020) (A drug offender will qualify for the expanded safety
valve if:
(1) (A) defendant does not have “more than four criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense . . .; (B) a prior 3-point offense . . .; and
(C) a prior 2-point violent offense . . .; (2) defendant did not use violence or credible threats
of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon . . .; (3) the offense did not result
in death or serious bodily injury . . .; (4) defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager,
or supervisor [in the drug organization] . . .; and (5) . . . defendant has truthfully provided
to the Government all [relevant] information and evidence . . . .”).
223 See Congressional Research Service, The First Step Act of 2018: An Overview, CRS,
(Mar. 4, 2019), at 16. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45558.pdf. A maximum of 54 days of
good time credits for each year the sentence was imposed rather than served. Id.; see also
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentence and Prison Impact Estimate Summary,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/prison-and-sentencing-impact-assessments/January_2019_Impact_Analysis.pdf. “Offenders with a sentence of
more than one year but other than a term of imprisonment for life may receive credit towards the service of their sentence if they demonstrate ‘exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.;’” Id. Telephone Interview with Priya Raghavan, Counsel,
Justice Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law (Jan. 30, 2019) (agreeing that in the aggregate the change to “good time credits” will positively impact the size of
the prison population).
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(iii) section 404—retroactive application of the FSA to pre-FSA
sentences.224
Recent studies revealed that within seven months after the First
Step Act was enacted, the DOJ released 3,100 federal prisoners on
section 102(b) good time credits and Congress employed the judiciary to administer section 404 retroactive application of the
FSA.225 In only nine months the courts granted 1,987 FSA sentence reductions.226 Plus, 1,100 federal inmates were released
from confinement.227 The average FSA sentence reduction was
from 253 months to 183 months and the reductions were made primarily for African Americans (91.2%) and Hispanics (4.2%).228 Already, the numbers confirm that legislative criminal justice reform promotes expediency, predictability, and stability.229 These
very characteristics are incongruent with the flaws of using executive clemency to correct mass incarceration.230
The provisions of the First Step Act are laudable changes to sentencing laws that will affect thousands of federal inmates: 40,900
eligible for the prospective safety valve over the next twenty years;
142,448 eligible for prerelease custody as of May 2018; and 2,660

224 See Congressional Research Service, supra note 224, at 9.
225 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Announces the Release of 3,100 In-

mates Under First Step Act, Publishes Risk and Needs Assessment System (July 19, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-release-3100-inmates-under-first-step-act-publishes-risk-and. Courts are now charged to exercise judicial discretion to determine if a petitioner should be granted an FSA sentence reduction after the
petitioner has made a motion. See also supra note 54; see also American Bar Association,
First Step Act Already Shows Success (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/publications/washingtonletter/august_2010_WL/first_step_act_article/. Judges have not abused this discretion. Compare
Part III.C.
226 See U.S. Sentencing Commission, First Step Act of 2018 Resentencing Provisions
Retroactivity Data Report, (Oct. 2019), at 5, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/retroactivity-analyses/first-step-act/20191030-First-Step-ActRetro.pdf. Of those granted sentence reductions, 1,894 were sentenced from 1990 to 2000
and 84 from 2011-2013. See id. Compare Part III.C.
227 See Sadie Gurman, Justice Department Set to Free 3,000 Prisoners as CriminalJustice Overhaul Takes Hold, WALL STREET J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-set-to-free-3-000-prisoners-as-criminal-justice-overhaul-takes-hold-11563528601
(July 19, 2019, 04:26 PM).
228 See U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 227, at 7, 9. Compare Part III.B, III.C.
229 See Claire Ashley Saba, A Roadmap for Comprehensive Criminal Justice Reform to
Employ Ex-Offenders: Beyond Title VII and Ban the Box, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 547, 566
(2019).
230 See id.
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defendants eligible for retroactive application of the FSA as of May
2018.231
The irony is that Alice Marie Johnson would still be in federal
prison even after the passage of the First Step Act.232 Presumably,
Alice Marie Johnson would have met the substantive requirements of the safety valve because Congress made a huge misstep
with its ‘first step’ when it failed to make section 402 retroactive.233 This error would have denied Alice Marie Johnson freedom.234
B. The Second Step—The Four Rs
So, what must be Congress’ second step? Legislative reform
must encapsulate the “Four Rs” of sentencing reform: (1) Repeal,
(2) Retroact, (3) Review, and (4) Revise.235
(1) Repeal mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenders who are not serious drug felons in conjunction with
the expanded safety valve criteria in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
(f).236
Since the passage of the SRA, mandatory minimums have facilitated easier convictions for first-time, low-level, and nonviolent
drug offenders because mandatory minimums curtailed judicial
discretion and emboldened prosecutors to charge crimes that resulted in unjust sentences.237 The primary issue with mandatory
minimum sentences is that no two drug crimes are identical, but
231 See U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 224, at 1.
232 See supra notes 223-25. Alice Marie Johnson would not have qualified for prerelease

custody because she was serving a life sentence.
233 See supra note 223.
234 See supra notes 223, 225-26.
235 This is a term coined by the author.
236 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (f) (2020); supra note 223. See also U.S. Sentencing Commission, First Step Act, (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/newsletters/2019-special_FIRST-STEP-Act.pdf. A serious drug offense is one that is prohibited
by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A) for which the defendant served a term of imprisonment of
more than 12 months and was released from any term of imprisonment within 15 years of
the instant offense.
237 See supra Parts I and II. See also WEAPONIZING JUSTICE: MANDATORY
MINIMUMS, THE TRIAL PENALTY, AND THE PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT, 31 FED .
SENT. R. 309, 310, 2019 WL 2453398.
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mandatory minimums ignore this fact and institutes a one-sizefits-all sentencing scheme where standardized weight-based penalties are valued more than individualized sentencing.238 This argument is not devoid of historical context. In 1970 Congress
passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act and repealed most drug-related federal mandatory minimum
sentences.239 That 1970 Congress recognized the rigidity of mandatory minimum sentences and strived to establish “a more realistic, more flexible, and thus more effective system of punishment
and deterrence of violations of the Federal narcotic and dangerous
drug laws.”240 The House of Representatives stated, “severe penalties, which do not take into account individual circumstances,
and which treat casual violators as severely as they treat hardened
criminals, tend to make conviction . . . more difficult to obtain.”241
Repealing mandatory minimum sentences for first-time, lowlevel, and nonviolent drug offenders makes sense. In 2017, “[o]nly
19.4% of federal drug cases involved a weapon. Almost two-thirds
of persons convicted of offenses involving powder cocaine (63.8%)
and marijuana (63.3%) had the lowest criminal history possible
. . . .”242 In addition, there exists an inverse correlative relationship between age and the recidivism rate.243 Mandatory minimums provide diminishing returns for first-time, low-level and
nonviolent drug offenders because “people generally age out of
crime. The 18-year-old who is given a long sentence for robbing a
pharmacy is much less likely to engage in crime when he is 40.”244

238 See Molly M. Gill, Let’s Abolish Mandatory Minimums the Punishment Must Fit the
Crime, HUM. RTS., SPRING 2009, at 4, 5. The circumstances and drug offenders’ criminal
background, state of mind, and level of involvement varies from case to case.; see also Kevin
Ring in USA Today: “I once wrote mandatory minimum laws. After ties to Abramoff landed
me in prison, I know they must end.,” FAMM (Oct. 17, 2018), https://famm.org/kevin-ringin-usa-today-i-once-wrote-mandatory-minimum-laws-after-ties-to-abramoff-landed-me-inprison-i-know-they-must-end/.
239 See Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two
Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 66 (2009).
240 Jelani Jefferson Exum, From Warfare to Welfare: Reconceptualizing Drug Sentencing During the Opioid Crisis, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 941, 943 (2019).
241 Tonry supra, note 240, at 71.
242 Stephen F. Smith, Federalization’s Folly, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31, 49 (2019).
243 See generally Haile, supra note 75, at 644.
244 See id.
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It follows that, mandatory minimums are actually only suited for
high-rate or extremely dangerous drug offenders.245
There is overwhelming support for the repeal of mandatory minimum sentences on every hand.246 FAMM likens repealing mandatory minimum sentences to turning off the spigot of an overflowing bathtub and recommends that this should be the first step in
criminal justice reform.247 Federal judges purport that mandatory
minimums impose grave costs on the offender and the criminal
justice system.248 One federal judge in Iowa stated, “in most of the
over 1,000 congressionally-mandated mandatory minimum sentences that I have imposed over the past twenty-two years, I have
stated on the record that they were unjust and too harsh.”249 Seventy-seven percent of the American public agreed that mandatory
minimum sentences for non-violent drug offenders should be eliminated so that the judiciary can resume its traditional role of dispensing fair and just sentences commensurate to the crime.250
Further, Congress would not be alone in its repeal of mandatory
minimum sentences. States have recognized the detrimental effects of mass incarceration on “prisoners, their families, and society” and have been proactive in tackling sentencing and prison reform.251 Thus, state models can inform the federal solution for
mandatory minimum sentences.252
245 See Michael Tonry, Equality and Human Dignity: The Missing Ingredients in American Sentencing, 45 CRIME & JUST. 459, 474 (2016).
246 See infra Part IV.B.1.
247 See Molly M. Gill, The Paul-Leahy “Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013” S. 619: Preventing Lives and Money From Being Lost Down the Drain, 26 FED. SENT. R. 94, 97 (2013)
[hereinafter Paul-Leahy].
248 See Jessica A. Roth, The “New” District Court Activism in Criminal Justice Reform,
74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 277, 288-89 (2019).
249 Id. at 289.
250 See Christopher Ingraham, Here’s how much Americans hate mandatory minimum
sentences, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/01/heres-how-much-americans-hate-mandatory-minimum-sentences/.
251 Andrew D. Leipold, Is Mass Incarceration Inevitable?, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1579,
1596 (2019).
252 See Dartunorro Clark, Massachusetts Has a Blueprint for What’s Next in Criminal
Justice Reform, NBC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politicsnews/massachusetts-has-blueprint-what-s-next-criminal-justice-reform-n1105911 (explaining that Massachusetts eliminated some mandatory minimum sentences for low-level
drug offenders); see also Senate Approves Criminal Justice Reforms, OKLA. ST. SENATE
(Apr. 17, 2018), http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press_releases/press_releases_2018/pr20180417a.htm (explaining that Oklahoma eliminated life without parole
for drug possession with intent to distribute, distribution, manufacturing and trafficking
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(2) Retroactive application for the expanded safety valve and the
repeal of mandatory minimum sentences
Retroactivity is key in order to promote fairness in sentencing
reform.253 It is inequitable that “two individuals who commit the
exact same offense should . . . receive different punishments
merely because they are sentenced on different dates.”254 An approach that allows only prospective reforms weighs the date of sentencing more heavily than the conduct and characteristics of the
defendant.255
The Brennan Center for Justice commended Congress for its significant first step after the passage of the First Step Act but recognized that the bill represented a compromise of a compromise
because most of the sentencing reform changes were not given retroactive effect when compared to legislation proposed during the
Obama Administration.256 Specifically, the Sentencing Reform
and Corrections Act of 2017 expanded the federal safety valve for
low-level drug offenders (like the First Step Act) and made the
change retroactive.257 The Commission estimated that the retroactive provisions of the Act would cause 12,000 federal prisoners
to be eligible for sentence reductions.258
When Congress created the drug offense safety valve in 1994 it
intended to address the concern that “many first-time, low-level,
and nonviolent drug offenders were receiving mandatory minimums that did not fit them or their crimes.”259 Today, the safety
and many other mandatory minimum sentences).; see also FAMM Praises Maryland Leaders for Eliminating Mandatory Minimums for Low-Level Drug Offenders, FAMM (Apr. 12,
2016), https://famm.org/famm-praises-maryland-leaders-for-eliminating-mandatory-minimums-for-low-level-drug-offenders/ (explaining that Maryland passed the Justice Reinvestment Act in 2016 which repealed mandatory minimum sentences for low-level drug offenders, expanded the existing safety valve, and made the changes retroactive so that low-level
offenders can petition for revised and reduced sentences).
253 See Haile, supra note 75, at 640-42.
254 Id. at 640.
255 See id.
256 See Raghavan, supra note 224.
257 See S. 1917: Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2017 (115th Congress),
FAMM (Apr. 27, 2018), https://famm.org/s-1917-sentencing-reform-corrections-act-2017115th-congress.
258 See Haile, supra note 75, at 641. This is likely the sum total for all of the retroactive
provisions of the Act.
259 See Paul-Leahy, supra note 248 at 94.
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valve is an important feature of federal sentencing because it allows this category of federal drug offenders to escape prison sentences that do not match their crimes and level of culpability.260
But, when Congress failed to make section 402 retroactive in the
First Step Act, it maintained the status quo for defendants like
Alice Marie Johnson and left thousands in federal prison.261 So, it
is necessary to make a sentencing reform bill retroactive to expedite “the reduction of the federal prison population, and [correct]
. . . unwarranted disparities.”262
The retroactive application of the repeal of mandatory minimum
sentences for first-time, low-level, and nonviolent drug offenders
would have a tremendous impact on the federal prison population
while also incurring a negligible impact on public safety.263 A decrease in the prison population does not necessarily result in an
increase in the crime rate.264 The Federal Bureau of Prisons reported that, as of December 26, 2019, there were 175,858 inmates
housed in federal prison.265 Of the total federal inmates, 58.3%
and 16.6% were serving original sentences from five to twenty
years, and twenty years to life imprisonment respectively.266 Of
the total federal inmates, 73,784 (or 45.3%) were serving time for
drug offenses.267 Therefore, “any efforts to reduce federal incarceration should start with drug offenses.”268
(3) Judicial Review of drug offender petitions, and (4) Revise
sentences on account of the retroactive expanded safety
valve and repealed mandatory minimum sentences and in

260
261
262
263

See id. at 94, 97.
See supra note 176.
Haile, supra note 75, at 640.
See Column: 5 charts show why mandatory minimum sentences don’t work, PBS
(June 1, 2017, 11:45 A.M.), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/5-charts-show-mandatory-minimum-sentences-dont-work.
264 See Leipold, supra note 252, at 1595-96.
265 See Statistics, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp (last updated Dec. 26, 2019).
266 See Sentences Imposed, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_sentences.jsp (last updated Dec. 21, 2019).
267 See Offenses, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp (last updated Dec. 28, 2019). The percentage of federal inmates
for other categories ranged from 0.2% to 19%. Id.
268 Ryan King et al., How to reduce the federal prison population, U RBAN INST., (Oct.
2015) http://apps.urban.org/features/reducing-federal-mass-incarceration/.
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accordance with 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582 (c)(1)(B) and
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (a)269
The retroactive application of the FSA marks a shift of the balance of power from prosecutors to the judiciary where judges can
exercise discretion and grant sentence reductions considering
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (a) criteria.270 It will be the same effect with
this proposed solution to ‘repeal’ and ‘retroact.’
The Commission’s most recent amendment to the Guidelines for
drug offenses indicate courts can handle “resentencing with relative ease” when it does not need to engage in “backward-looking
factual determinations or . . . complicated legal analysis.”271
Amendment 782, also known as “Drugs Minus Two” went into effect in November 2014 and the change was made retroactive.272
The role of the judiciary in the execution of Amendment 782 illustrated that judges are neither ineffective nor inefficient in administering sentence reductions based on retroactive sentencing reform.273 Federal judges granted over 30,000 sentence reductions
with an average sentence reduction of 25 months.274 Similarly, the
proposed second step retroactive solutions can be implemented by
foregoing prosecutorial, evidentiary, and other investigative inquiry, and embracing the Guidelines ranges to resentence firsttime, low-level, and nonviolent drug offenders.275 Simply, the judiciary can “recalibrate the offender’s sentence within a new sentencing range, as courts successfully did when implementing
Amendment 782.”276

269 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3553; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582 (c)(1)(B).
270 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3553.
271 Nathaniel W. Reisinger, Redrawing The Line: Retroactive Sentence Reductions,

Mass Incarceration, and the Battle Between Justice and Finality, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
299, 304 (2019); see also 2014 Drug Amendment, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION,
https://www.ussc.gov/topic/2014-drug-amendment.
272 Reisinger, supra note 272, at 304.
273 See id.
274 See id.
275 See id. at 312.
276 See id.
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CONCLUSION
Though the Framers provided broad discretion to the President
to exercise the clemency power, one cannot imagine the Framers
intended clemency to replace the role of the legislature to correct
inequities in the criminal justice system.277 Rather, the clemency
tool should be used in extenuating and individualized circumstances when the law fails to effectuate justice. The evidence reveals a legislative solution that institutes retroactive sentencing
reform is a more viable solution than clemency to solve America’s
mass incarceration problem. Certainly, this is true reform—and
clemency alone could not achieve the desired results. While Congress took a solid first step towards legislative reform with the
First Step Act, strong second steps must come next. The four Rs—
Repeal, Retroact, Review, and Revise—should be the core of the
next legislative reform.

277 See James Pfiffner, Pardon Power, HERITAGE, https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/2/essays/89/pardon-power.

